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NELMCC COMP PROB_FINAL

2010 National Environmental Law Moot Court
*
Competition Problem
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TWELFTH CIRCUIT
___________________________________
FRIENDS OF RESPONSIBLE TRADE
and two of its members,
ACE VENTURA and JUAN VALDEZ
Appellants,
v.
GREEN RECYCLING GROUP, INC.
and
NEWTOWN PARENT TEACHERS
ASSOCIATION, INC.
Appellees,
v.
LISA JACKSON ADMINISTRATOR,
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,

׀
׀
׀

CIVIL ACTION
Civ. 09-1001

׀
׀
׀
׀

Intervenor-Appellee
___________________________________
ORDER
Following the issuance of the Order of the District Court
dated August 31, 2009, in the above-captioned matter; all parties
filed a Notice of Appeal. Appellant Friends of Responsible Trade
(FRT), along with two of its members, take issue with the
decision of the lower court with respect to (1) its standing as a
membership organization and as individuals, (2) the dismissal of
all Alien Tort Claims Act claims for the injuries to Appellant

*

The 2010 Problem was written by Pace Law School Professor Jeffery G.
Miller, Vice Dean for Academic Affairs, with the assistance of Alexandra
Dapolito Dunn, Pace Law School Assistant Dean of Environmental Law
Programs and Adjunct Professor of Law and Sean T. Dixon, Research Fellow for
the Pace Law School Center for Environmental Legal Studies.
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Juan Valdez, (3) the denial of relief under RCRA citizen suit
provisions due to lack of ongoing violations by the Appellees
Green Recycling Group Inc. (GRG) and Newtown Parent Teachers
Association, Inc. (Newtown PTA), and (4) the determination as to
the non-hazardous nature of the exported solid waste. The
Environmental Protection Agency (and Lisa Jackson as
Administrator) (EPA or United States) takes issue with (1) the
determination as to the inapplicability of RCRA to the contents of
container #VS2078.
Therefore, it hereby ordered that the parties brief all of the
following issues:
1. Whether Appellant FRT has sufficient constitutional or
statutory standing to bring any action against GRG and
Newtown PTA for violations resulting from the export of
container #VS2078 to Geraldo Garcia’s recycling plant.
(GRG and Newtown PTA argue that FRT and its members
have no standing to sue over the exported materials; FRT
argues that there is standing under ATCA and RCRA; EPA
**
argues that RCRA applies but the ATCA does not.)
2. Whether the ATCA provides an alternate basis for
plaintiffs’ standing. (GRG and Newtown PTA argue that the
court properly dismissed the applicability of the statute;
EPA argues that, as a matter of policy, its regulations are
sufficient to protect the interests of foreign citizens and that
expansion of ATCA claims would be an impediment to the
administrative process; FRT argues that the international
custom and Congressional action on the issue supports a
claim of jurisdiction under ATCA).
3. Whether a dismissal of the suit as between FRT and GRG
and Newtown PTA (the original parties) ends the action
with respect to the intervenor EPA’s claims. (GRG and
Newtown PTA argue that it does as the EPA can bring its
own enforcement actions at any time; EPA argues that
justice would best be served by allowing the action to
continue with EPA as a party and that the EPA has an
**
Grayed out text was added or changed in response to official NELMCC
Q&A period and can be used by all teams.
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independent, jurisdictional basis for its involvement in the
action; FRT agrees that in the interests of justice, if its case
is dismissed, the EPA should still be allowed to continue
litigation in order to resolve the situation at hand).
4. Whether the lower court properly analyzed the facts in
terms of the solid waste nature of the exported materials,
and, whether the export of container #VS2078 in the
manner described subjects GRG and Newtown PTA to
RCRA liability. (GRG and Newtown PTA argue that they
are not subject to RCRA liability as their goods cease to be
“solid waste” once they are sent outside the United States
for recycling; FRT and EPA argue that RCRA nonetheless
applies to the exported waste).
5. Whether the materials exported are considered hazardous
for the purposes of RCRA; and, therefore, whether GRG and
Newtown PTA are liable for violating the testing and
reporting provisions of RCRA’s hazardous waste sections.
(GRG and Newtown PTA argue that the materials in
container #VS2078 are not hazardous as defined under
RCRA; EPA and FRT argue that because no exceptions
apply and these types of materials are known to be toxic, the
materials are hazardous for the purposes of RCRA).
SO ORDERED
Entered this 29th day of September, 2009.

[NOTE: No cases decided after September 1, 2009 may be cited either in the
briefs or in oral argument.]
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF
NEW UNION
___________________________________
FRIENDS OF RESPONSIBLE TRADE
and two of its members,
ACE VENTURA and JUAN VALDEZ
Appellants,
v.
GREEN RECYCLING GROUP, INC.
and
NEWTOWN PARENT TEACHERS
ASSOCIATION, INC.
Appellees,
v.
LISA JACKSON ADMINISTRATOR,
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,

׀
׀
׀

CIVIL ACTION
Civ. 08360-2008

׀
׀
׀
׀

Intervenor-Appellee
___________________________________
ORDER
Friends of Responsible Trade (FRT) and two individual
members of that organization filed a complaint (with all notice
obligations fulfilled) against the Green Recycling Group, Inc. and
the Newtown Parent Teachers Association (together defendants,
GRG, or GRG and Newtown PTA), pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§6972(a)(1)(A), alleging that GRG and Newtown PTA violated the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§6901 et
seq. (RCRA), by sending used electronic devices (UEDs) abroad
for salvage and recycling without complying with the
requirements of RCRA pertaining to the disposal of hazardous
waste. FRT and its two members seek civil penalties for the
violations, an injunction against further violations of RCRA, and
compensatory damages for injuries suffered by the two members
as a result of the violations. One of FRT’s members also bases
jurisdiction for his claim for personal injury on the Alien Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (ATCA). The United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA or United States) filed a
motion to intervene pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 6972(d). After full
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discovery, FRT, joined by the United States, filed a motion for
partial summary judgment against GRG and Newtown PTA,
asking this Court to find that they have violated RCRA, and
leaving the remedial portion of this action for disposition after
trial. Thereafter, GRG and Newtown PTA filed a countermotion
for summary judgment against FRT and the United States,
asking for a ruling either 1) that this court has no jurisdiction to
entertain the action by FRT and its members (and that the EPA
would then be prevented from carrying on litigation without the
original parties) or 2) that GRG and Newtown PTA have not
violated RCRA. The United States agreed with GRG and
Newtown PTA that this court does not have jurisdiction to hear
the case brought by FRT and its members under the Alien Tort
Claims Act (arguing that the agency’s regulations sufficiently
address the environmental concerns of international transport of
hazardous and solid waste and that to confer jurisdiction under
the ATCA would arbitrarily circumvent EPA administrative
procedure), but argued that the court does have jurisdiction to
hear the claim of the United States that GRG and Newtown PTA
have violated RCRA.
Plaintiff FRT and its members lack standing to sue GRG and
Newtown PTA for RCRA violations under all theories of standing.
As member Ventura has no injury in fact that is fairly traceable
to GRG’s actions, and as member Valdez cannot prove that his
injuries were the result of actions by GRG and Newtown PTA,
membership organization FRT and its members lack
constitutional standing. Under RCRA, no plaintiff has standing
because there is no ongoing violation, plaintiff Valdez is not a
citizen of the United States, and because the harms suffered by
the plaintiffs were caused by the actions of a negligent recycling
factory operator, RCRA does not afford the plaintiffs statutory
standing. Plaintiff Valdez does not have ATCA jurisdiction as
that law does not allow for hazardous pollution concerns of one
nation’s citizen to be voiced in the United States absent a law of
nations or customary international law. As the plaintiff has no
standing to continue litigation, intervenor EPA must, and did,
show that there is a proper basis for continuing the litigation
without the original plaintiffs—namely, EPA’s independent
ability to enforce RCRA against GRG and Newtown PTA. Upon
an examination of the facts, however, this Court concludes that
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the waste collected by GRG and Newtown PTA was household in
nature and thus exempt from hazardous classification under
RCRA, and accordingly, are exempt from RCRA.
The Factual Background
The following facts are not contested. GRG is in the business
of collecting UEDs for sale to foreign salvagers and recyclers. It
collects these materials by entering into partnerships with
community organizations, such as Newtown PTA, who, in turn,
solicit UEDs from neighborhood households. GRG requires
anyone seeking free collection of UEDs to execute a form
acknowledging that the particular devices collected were owned
by them and used in their households. After collecting sufficient
UEDs to fill a shipping container, GRG ships the container to a
salvage and recycling company abroad to salvage still useable
UEDs and components and to reclaim precious metals and
plastics from the remaining unusable UEDs. All items in the
container are from the Newtown PTA event.
Ace Ventura and Juan Valdez are both members of FRT.

FRT is a tax-exempt 501(c)(3) membership-based organization that
advocates for Responsible Trade practices on behalf of its members,
which include citizens from all parts of the United States, and in some
cases, foreign nations. Ventura, a freelance photojournalist and
citizen of the United States, learned that UEDs were often sent
abroad to unregulated recycling facilities whose activities
sometimes injured employees, neighbors, and the environment.
He identified an effort by GRG and Newtown PTA to collect
UEDs in the town of Newtown, State of New Union. Newtown
PTA solicited members of local households to bring their UEDs to
the parking lot of the Newtown High School on two particular
Saturdays for recycling. Newtown PTA told the residents that
their devices would either be reused for their original purposes in
a less developed country or recycled to put their components to
good use. GRG supplied the shipping container for the UEDs and
Newtown PTA’s members supervised the collection of the
material. The Newtown PTA members placed devices in the
container only after a visual examination showed that all of the
UEDs were intact and after residents signed a form (supplied by
GRG) stating that “I (we) have used the electronic devices
identified below in my (our) home and wish to have them used by

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss3/9
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others or recycled because they are no longer useful to us. All
UEDs placed into the container are intact.” The form included
spaces to identify the particular electronic device(s) rendered. A
significant number of the UEDs were MyPhones. MyPhones are
a larger, less versatile, version of the popular Apple iPhone.
Unlike the Apple iPhone (which has taken steps to use only
environmentally friendly materials), the MyPhone uses a
mercury-lithium battery and small quantities of other toxic
materials, including lead. The significant difference between the two

devices is that the MyPhone contains a mercury-lithium battery, and
more lead and other toxic materials than the iPhone. Newtown, which
is the home to the MyPhone corporate headquarters, was chosen
as one of many test-run audiences for the device, but the
concurrently-released iPhone quickly ran the MyPhone market to
the ground. The MyPhone, while able to play music, connect to
the internet, and even act as a walkie-talkie, could not adequately
make phone calls. As such, most Newtown residents found
themselves with a heavy, useless device. Newtown PTA and GRG
thereafter developed the recycling program that led to the
litigation at hand.
Ventura photographed many of the UEDs that Newtown
PTA’s members had placed in container simply labeled #VS2078 in
the Newtown PTA High School parking lot on June 19, 2008,
including used normal cell phones, pagers, televisions, computers
and computer components, all intact. The MyPhones shown in
the photographs appear to be intact, some even in their original
packaging. Affidavits from GRG officials state that most of the
bulk of the container was comprised of MyPhones from the
Newtown residents. Ventura ascertained that container #VS2078
was entirely filled with material collected at Newtown PTA on
two successive Saturdays and was sent by GRG a week later to
Geraldo Garcia, in the city of Pacifica, Sud-Americano. SudAmericano is a developing country with no regulatory scheme
governing the recycling of UEDs or the pollution resulting from
such activities. Sud-Americano is a NON-OECD nation, but has
ratified the Basel Convention. No other paperwork, aside from
customs documents, was used by GRG in the international
shipment of the container to Sud-Americano.
Garcia sorts UEDs and their components, including those in
container #VS2078, to separate out those still useful in the Sud-
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Americano market, either selling them in that market or
donating them, particularly the laptops and computers, to local
schools. He operates only in the city of Pacifica. He hires local
residents to reclaim heavy metals and other valuable materials
from the remaining unusable UEDs, including those in container
#VS2078. He salvages approximately half of the devices or their
components by volume for reuse in Sud-Americano. He had
conducted these operations over a period of six years prior to
receipt of container #VS2078 from GRG. Because Garcia failed to
supply the workers with protective devices, including gloves and
masks, or equipment designed for safe removal of material from
the UEDs, the workers, including appellant and FRT member
Juan Valdez, were directly exposed to mercury, lead, cadmium,
chromium and other toxic materials, endangering their health.
Valdez had worked in Garcia’s operations from their inception.
In addition, because Garcia failed to properly collect, contain, and
manage waste from the operations, mercury, lead and other
heavy metals entered into the water and land of the local
environment, further endangering local inhabitants (including
Juan Valdez) and potentially endangering anyone encountering
the local environment (including Ace Ventura).
Ventura made a documentary film of the activities of GRG,
Newtown PTA, and Garcia, highlighting the exposure of Valdez,
and other workers and residents, to the toxic materials sourced in
recycled UEDs supplied by GRG and others, and the injuries
possibly caused by those exposures. Indeed, expert medical
deposition testimony established that Valdez suffers from
memory and neurological losses “of the type caused by lead and
mercury poisoning.” Ventura’s film, “Toxic Recycling,” has been
awarded prizes for the best documentary film at three different
film festivals, has aired on public television, and has earned over
$100,000 for Ventura, net of expenses. Ventura has no present
physical manifestations of injury from exposure to toxic material.
Constitutional Standing
Plaintiffs in this case are FRT, Ventura, and Valdez, bringing
suit under RCRA’s citizen suit provision, 42 U.S.C. §6972. FRT
argues that it has standing to bring this case based on theories of
representational standing as outlined in Sierra Club v. Morton.
For an organization to show standing under Morton, as a

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss3/9
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threshold matter that organization must demonstrate that it has
individual members who would have standing. FRT asserts
representational standing based on two contentions: (1) because
its member, Juan Valdez, was injured by exposure to mercury,
lead and other substances from GRG’s and Newtown PTA’s
activities violating RCRA and (2) because its member Ace
Ventura, was exposed to and injured by the same substances
while filming in Pacifica and is afraid to return to Pacifica
because he would suffer further exposure to toxic contamination.
In this regard, Valdez and Ventura claim standing on the same
basis: the environmental degradation and pollution resulting
from GRG and Newtown PTA’s export activities.
Standing, of course, requires that the plaintiff have suffered
an injury-in-fact that is fairly traceable to the alleged violation
and which is susceptible to remedy by the court. Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (1992).
Neither Valdez nor Ventura can make this showing. Therefore,
FRT is unable to demonstrate it merits representational
standing. Valdez has not established that GRG’s and Newtown
PTA’s alleged violations of RCRA caused him an injury for a
number of reasons. Although there is no doubt that Valdez is
suffering injuries, he cannot demonstrate that his injuries are
fairly traceable to the complained-of action. Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561. First, he has presented no
evidence that his injuries were actually caused by lead and
mercury poisoning, just that they were consistent with lead and
mercury poisoning. Second, assuming Valdez’ injuries were
caused by lead and mercury poisoning, he has presented no
evidence they were caused by lead and mercury from material in
container #VS2078. Indeed, because Valdez had done similar
work, with similar exposures for six years prior to the arrival of
that container, it is far more likely that his injuries were caused
by previous exposures to similar material than by exposure to
#VS2078 material. Third, it was the failure of Garcia to properly
conduct his recycling operations that exposed Valdez to lead and
mercury, not the collection and shipment of the material by GRG
and Newtown PTA.
Ventura alleges no particular physical injury from GRG’s and
Newtown PTA’s activities.
He testified that he was so
emotionally upset by seeing gross pollution emanating from
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Garcia’s operations and by seeing workers, such as Valdez, who
were “obviously” injured by such pollution, that he is afraid to
return to Pacifica. He testified that the sights in Pacifica brought
him to tears. If so, they were crocodile tears. Ventura was not
injured by these sights; to the contrary, they benefitted him
enormously, literally bringing him fame and fortune.
As neither Ventura nor Valdez has demonstrated an injuryin-fact, neither one has Constitutional standing to bring the case
now before the Court. Furthermore, as FRT’s representational
standing argument rests upon the standing of Ventura and
Valdez, it also fails. None of the Plaintiffs therefore have
standing to bring this case and it must be dismissed in favor of
the defendants GRG and Newtown PTA. Given, however, the
potential for alternative bases of jurisdiction for the plaintiffs
under RCRA and the Alien Tort Claims Act, and the potential
continuation of litigation by the EPA, the analysis does not end
here.
Statutory Standing: RCRA
Plaintiffs’ claims fail to establish jurisdiction under RCRA.
In a so-called RCRA “citizen suit,” citizens are empowered to
enforce the statute when the government fails to do so. Valdez
cannot bring a citizen suit because simply put, Valdez is not a
citizen of the United States. Citizens of the United States have
an interest to see that the laws of their country are enforced.
Resident aliens or even visiting aliens may have a lesser interest
in doing so. But it is difficult to see how a citizen of another
country who has never been in the United States and manifests
no intention of visiting it has an interest to see that the laws of
the United States are complied with. Nothing in RCRA or its
legislative history suggests that Congress meant to empower the
world to enforce RCRA when it enacted 42 U.S.C. §6972.1

1. Even if Valdez had a legitimate citizen suit claim, 42 U.S.C. § 6972,
authorizes as relief for violations of RCRA only injunctive relief for compliance
and assessment of civil penalties payable to the United States Treasury.
Payment of compensatory damages for physical injuries is not authorized.
Thus, this court could not redress his physical injury under 42 U.S.C. § 6972,
and therefore Valdez has no standing to pursue that claim under that section.
Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 88 (1998). While
his claim might be susceptible to a claim for personal injury by way of pendant
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The RCRA citizen suit provision does not confer jurisdiction
in this case even if Valdez or Ventura could themselves establish
standing and even if GRG’s and Newtown PTA’s actions
constituted a violation of RCRA. That follows from the wording of
42 U.S.C. §6972(a)(1)(A), which authorizes suit against persons
alleged “to be in violation of RCRA.” The statute does not enable
actions based on wholly past actions. The violation here occurred
in 2008 and involved one shipment of one container (container
#VS2078). FRT alleges that GRG sent other containers of similar
material abroad for recycling and will do so again.2 GRG admits
that it sent other containers of similar material abroad for
salvage and recycling on several previous and subsequent
occasions, but never to Pacifica or anywhere else in SudAmericano. It also admits that it has an open-ended contract
with Garcia for potential future containers of UEDs to be sent to
Pacifica under specified terms, but GRG states that no such
shipments have occurred to date, presumably because of the
pendency of this litigation. Whether GRG has further dealings
with Garcia in Pacifica, therefore, is purely speculative. Under
these circumstances, there is no present or imminent future
violation by either Newtown PTA or GRG to confer standing
under §6972(a)(1)(A). Basel Action Network v. Maritime Admin.,
370 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D.D.C. 2005).
Valdez has presented no evidence that GRG or Newtown PTA
participated in or even knew of Garcia’s disregard of the safety of
his workers or the environment. Finally, if GRG and Newtown
PTA violated RCRA, they did so in the United States. Their
activities in the United States, however, did not cause Valdez’ or
Ventura’s exposures to lead and mercury in Pacifica. The only
basis for jurisdiction left to FRT and its members is potential
jurisdiction under the ATCA.

jurisdiction, that is not the case here, for the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 (ATCA) governs jurisdiction over such actions. The ATCA does not grant
jurisdiction to entertain any such action, as analyzed in some detail below. To
allow such an action in tort by an alien under pendant jurisdiction would
subvert the restrictions on the jurisdiction of federal courts to entertain tort
claims by aliens established by the ATCA.
2. It did not make such allegations with regard to Newtown PTA. As far as
Newtown PTA is concerned, this was a one-time, isolated activity.
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Statutory Standing: ATCA
Valdez also brings a claim under the ATCA based on the
same injuries discussed above. While Valdez’s injuries were not
fairly traceable to a RCRA violation, Valdez argues that
defendants’ tortious actions directly led to his concrete actual
injuries.
Further, as ATCA enables plaintiffs to recover
compensatory damages, a successful ATCA claim is not hampered
by the redressability problems associated with the RCRA claim
above. Thus, this Court finds that Valdez has standing to
proceed with his ATCA claim based on the constitutional
requirements outlined in Lujan.
Demonstration of Article III standing, however, does not
automatically confer jurisdiction on this Court to hear the ATCA
claim. The ATCA provides jurisdiction for civil actions brought
by aliens “for a tort only” and then only if the tort was “committed
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”
28 U.S.C. § 1350. Torts giving rise to ATCA jurisdiction are few
and far between, because treaties and the law of nations normally
create obligations for countries, not for their citizens. Valdez first
cites the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movement of Hazardous Waste and Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989,
I.L.M. 657 (the Basel Convention). As its name implies, this
treaty deals specifically with the activities at issue here.
However, although this treaty has been ratified by 121 countries,
the United States has not ratified it; it has only signed the treaty.
Hence, even if GRG could have and did violate the Basel
Convention, that violation would not constitute a violation of a
treaty of the United States. Valdez next cites the Convention on
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development of
December 14, 1960 (the OECD Convention), which the United
States did ratify. The OECD Convention is only a framework
convention, and it does not deal directly with the export of
hazardous waste. The OECD Council, however, has issued a set
of requirements dealing with such export.
DecisionRecommendation of the Council on Exports of Hazardous Wastes
from the OECD Area, 5 June 1986-C(86)64/Final (the OECD
Hazardous Waste Decision). But the OECD Hazardous Waste
Decision directs member countries—not their individual
citizens—to take action to implement control of the export of
hazardous wastes. Hence GRG could not violate the Decision,
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only the United States could. The United States has indeed
taken actions to control such exports, including the enactment of
RCRA, the promulgation of EPA regulations on hazardous waste
export, and in the promulgation of OECD obligation regulations.
42 U.S.C. §6939, 40 C.F.R. §§262.50–58, and 40 C.F.R. §§262.80–
.89. However, RCRA and EPA’s regulations apply only to
hazardous waste and, as concluded below, the UEDs at issue are
not hazardous waste under RCRA.
Valdez also argues that the Basel Convention and the OECD
Hazardous Waste Decision Treaty establish the law of nations
with regard to the export of hazardous waste. Because the ATCA
was enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, 542 U.S. 692, 714 (2004), some argue that the only
tortious actions recognized under the ATCA are those that
violated the law of nations as it was understood in 1789, virtually
limiting such actions to piracy. See Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. at
739-740 (Scalia, J. concurring); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,
726 F.2d 774, 798-827 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J. concurring). The
Supreme Court recently rejected this crabbed interpretation of
the statute in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain. But the Court held that
the ATCA creates no cause of action; it only creates jurisdiction
and it does so only for a narrow range of torts: those resulting
from violations of international law as widely recognized and well
defined today as piracy was in 1789. Valdez argues that the
shipment of UEDs by GRG and Newtown PTA to recyclers in a
third world country without that country’s consent violates the a
well-defined norm of customary international law established by
the Basel Convention and the OECD Hazardous Waste Decision.
Use of the Basel Convention in this regard is suspect because the
United States has not ratified it. Valdez points to a holding that
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for
signature Dec. 10, 1982, U.N.T.S. 397 (UNCLOS), established
customary international law, even though the United States had
not ratified UNCLOS, Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d
1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part,
456 F. 3d. 1069 (9th Cir. 2006), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d
in part, 487 F. 3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007), hearing en banc granted,
499 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2007), aff’d, 550 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2008).
The strength of that precedent is lost in its subsequent history
and uncertain ultimate resolution.
Nor is that precedent
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persuasive, as it fails to note that the ATCA juxtaposes the “law
of nations” and a “treaty of the United States,” treating them as
separate, distinct, and different authorities. If the ATCA may be
invoked for violation of international law based on a treaty among
nations other than the United States, the limitation of invoking
the ATCA for violation of a treaty of the United States loses all
vitality. In any event, the Supreme Court in Sosa v. AlvarezMachain cautions us to construe the ATCA narrowly, limiting it
to violations of the law of nations that are well defined and well
established, like piracy. There is surely nothing well defined
about regulations dealing with the export of hazardous waste.
Even the determination of whether materials are hazardous
waste is a mind-numbing journey, as is evident from our
discussion below of whether the UEDs at issue here are
hazardous waste. There is simply no parallel between the thenwell-established crime of piracy and the commercial shipment
abroad of used computers and cell phones.
Continuation of Litigation by Intervenor
At oral argument, the parties differed on the procedural
effect that Plaintiffs’ lack of jurisdiction would have on the ability
of the United States to continue the action. GRG and Newtown
PTA argued that dismissal of the Plaintiffs’ action on
jurisdictional grounds was the end of the action, leaving no action
in which the United States can continue as an intervenor. The
FRT and the EPA disagreed. FRT argued that in the event that
the case is dismissed, the United States EPA should be allowed to
continue its action to enforce RCRA. The EPA argued that it has
an interest in the underlying controversy, namely, the potential
RCRA violations. As the plaintiffs have already been found to be
lacking standing, it is incumbent upon this court to determine
whether the EPA, in its own right, has an interest in the
litigation.
According to one court, there is “a difference between
permitting the United States to play an active role during the
pendency of private litigation, and permitting it to go forward
with the litigation in its own right after the private parties have
composed their differences.” Ruotolo v. Ruotolo, 572 F.2d 336, 339
(1st Cir. 1978). Here, the parties have not “composed their
differences”, as such, but the question remains. The Ruotolo
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court continues to note that in order to decide whether to permit
an intervening United States agency to continue litigation, the
government “must possess some independent basis as a party
apart from its status as intervenor”. Id., quoting Boston Tow Boat
Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 632, 88 L. Ed. 975, 64 S. Ct. 776
(1944). The need for an intervening appellant to have its own
basis of standing to continue litigation in the absence of the
original plaintiff was discussed by the Supreme Court in
Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986), but in a manner not
directly applicable here. In Diamond, the Court decided that an
intervening private citizen, to continue without the original
plaintiff, needed to show Article III standing. Id., at 69. This
Court concludes that EPA’s authority to intervene under 42
U.S.C. § 6972(d) is analogous to the need for Article III standing
articulated by the Court in Diamond. Because the issue of RCRA
violation falls within the direct purview of the EPA agency
authority, it has sufficient interest, basis, and standing to
continue the suit in absence of the original plaintiffs.3
RCRA Violations
RCRA establishes a so-called “cradle to grave” regulatory
system to assure that hazardous waste is properly managed to
avoid damage to persons or the environment. It requires that
most hazardous waste be treated, stored, or disposed of only at
facilities with RCRA permits to handle that waste, in accordance
with strict facility and operating requirements. It prohibits the
export of hazardous waste, except in compliance with 42 U.S.C.
§6938, which requires that persons proposing to export hazardous
waste notify EPA, obtain the written consent of the country to
which the proposed export will be sent, and ensure compliance
with any applicable treaties. EPA has promulgated regulations
3. Defendants GRG and Newtown PTA argue that because the EPA is free
to bring its own separate civil or criminal enforcement actions at any time, the
proper place for any RCRA suit by the Administrator of EPA is there, not here.
This contention is without merit as, under 42 U.S.C. § 6972(d), the EPA can
intervene in whichever citizen suits it likes. Such broad discretion indicates
that Congress intended to allow the EPA to make the decision as to when and
where to act towards the enforcement of RCRA. Because it could intervene, and
it did, this Court will not hold that decision against the agency. See Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct.
2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984).
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to implement these requirements, 40 C.F.R. §262.50–.58.
Whether particular material is subject to the RCRA regulatory
scheme depends on whether that material meets the definition of
“hazardous waste” that EPA has crafted in 40 C.F.R. Part 261. A
court more learned than this one has described navigating that
definition to be a “mind-numbing journey.” Am. Mining Cong. v.
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 824 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
Unfortunately, EPA has subsequently amended the definition to
make it even longer and more complicated. As both Congress and
EPA have charted it, determining whether a material is a
hazardous waste is a two-step process. First, it must be
determined if the material is a solid waste. Second, if the
material is a solid waste, it must be determined if the material is
hazardous under criteria established by EPA.
The EPA defines solid waste as “discarded material” not
otherwise excluded, 40 C.F.R. §261.2(a)(1). “Discarded material”
is material that is “abandoned,” “recycled,” “inherently wastelike,” or “a military munition,” 40 C.F.R. §261.2(2)(i). Material is
“abandoned” if it is “disposed of,” 40 C.F.R. §261.2(b). When the
citizens of New Union gave their UEDs to GRG and Newtown
PTA, they were disposing of those devices, hence the devices
became solid waste under this definition. Materials are also
abandoned if they are “recycled.” 40 C.F.R. §261.2(2)(i). Even
though some of the Newtown PTA-sourced UEDs that were not
salvaged for reuse were recycled (possibly making them solid
waste under this definition) they were recycled abroad and there
is no indication in RCRA that Congress intended to extend the
jurisdiction of RCRA to activities abroad. Amlon Metals, Inc. v.
FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). Thus, once the
materials left the United States, they were neither solid waste
nor hazardous waste for the purposes of RCRA applicability to
Garcia’s operations. This does not mean, of course, that they
were not solid waste in the United States or that the actions of
GRG and Newtown PTA in the United States to ship the
materials out of the United States were not subject to RCRA
jurisdiction. In fact, the very purpose of the Newtown PTA
collection event was to collect “abandoned” and “disposed of”
material—the MyPhone. The materials in the container were
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solid waste under RCRA jurisdiction while the container was in
the United States.4
Having established that the material is solid waste within
the United States because it was disposed of here, we would
normally continue to determine if the solid waste is hazardous,
using the various tests and lists contained in the remainder of
Part 261. Neither UEDs nor used intact CRTs are contained in
the lists of hazardous waste in Part 261. EPA argues, however,
that MyPhones test as hazardous under the toxicity test in 40
C.F.R. §261.24.
The material that had been in container
#VS2078, of course, is no longer available for testing. Plaintiffs
and EPA argue that is no matter for two reasons. First, UEDs
such as the MyPhone have routinely been found to fail the
toxicity test. Hazardous Waste Management System;
Modification of the Hazardous Waste Program; Cathode Ray
Tubes and Mercury-Containing Equipment, 67 Fed. Reg. 40,508510 (June 12, 2002) and TIMOTHY G. TOWNSEND ET AL., RCRA
TOXICITY CHARACTERIZATION OF CPUS AND OTHER DISGARDED
ELECTRICAL DEVICES (2004), available at http://www.ees.ufl.edu
/homepp/townsend/Research/ElectronicLeaching/UF%20EWaste%
20TC%20Report%20July%2004%20v1.pdf. This, however, is only
circumstantial evidence that the MyPhones in container #VS2078
were hazardous by the toxicity test. Second, Plaintiff and EPA
argue that EPA’s regulations, 40 C.F.R. §262.11, require
generators of solid waste to determine if their wastes are
hazardous, and failure to make that determination is a criminal
offense, 40 C.F.R. §262.11, United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741
(4th Cir. 1990). If GRG did not make this determination,
Plaintiffs and EPA argue, GRG violated RCRA and its solid waste
should be deemed to be hazardous. The problem with their
argument is that GRG is not a generator of solid waste and hence
is not subject to the determination requirement. It is a mere
collector of such material, generated by others. EPA argues it is
bringing enforcement actions under similar circumstances, In the
matter of EarthEcycle, LLC, EPA Docket No. RCRA-HQ-20090001, and that this Court should defer to its interpretation.
4. Unlike cathode ray tubes (similarly considered to contain toxic
materials), there are no provisions of EPA regulations that exempt UEDs such
as MyPhones from hazardous or solid waste RCRA applicability. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 261.39-.41.
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EPA’s other enforcement action, of course, is not before this Court
and EPA’s position there, and here, are just litigation positions,
not entitled to much, if any, deference.
GRG and Newtown PTA also point out 40 C.F.R. §261.4(b)(1),
which provides that solid wastes are not hazardous wastes if they
are “household waste.” This section defines, without much
additional illumination, “household waste” as “material derived
from households.” GRG and Newtown PTA took considerable
care to assure that they accepted only UEDs that were derived
from households. In short, while the UEDs at issue are solid
waste, EPA’s exclusion of “household [solid] waste” from
hazardous wastes removes it from the hazardous waste
regulatory scheme. Chicago v. Envtl Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328
(1994).
EPA and Plaintiffs further argue that some of the UEDs at
issue were not actually derived from households. They point to
one of Ventura’s pictures of three laptops in container #VS2078,
each with a label reading “Property of the United States
Government,” with a bar code beneath. An affidavit from a
federal security officer states that the bar code indicates the
laptops were used, ironically, in the EPA office in New Union.
EPA and Plaintiffs argue that however you characterize
“Property of the United States Government,” it is not a
household. While EPA’s regulations are silent on that issue, EPA
and Plaintiffs are correct on the point. However, neither the
labels nor the affidavit establish that the laptops came to the
container directly from EPA rather than from a household.
Moreover, the extensive precautions taken by GRG and Newtown
PTA to confine the UEDs collected to household material were
sufficient to prevent three laptops from changing the character of
the whole container from household waste to non-household
waste. Similarly unpersuasive is the argument that because
some of the MyPhones in the container were in their original
packaging, they could not be household waste. Again, the
diligence with which GRG and Newtown PTA cautioned against
any inclusion of non-household items proves significant. While
some community members may not have opened their MyPhones
before discarding them, they no doubt purchased or acquired the
item for its utility as a household phone. That word spread about
the dismal performance of the item and some people chose to
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discard their MyPhones without inspection is not relevant to the
household nature of the phone.
Order
The motion for partial summary judgment by FRT, its two
members and EPA is denied on all grounds propounded. The
motion for summary judgment by GRG and Newtown PTA and
EPA on the lack of jurisdiction of FRT and its members is
granted. The motion for summary judgment by GRG with respect
to the intervenor’s rights on appeal is denied, but the remainder
of the motion by GRG and Newtown PTA is granted as to all
other grounds.
SO ORDERED.
Romulus N. Remus
United States District Judge
August 31, 2009
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